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Historical Perspectives
Before we plunge into the present, a review of the historical
background of U.S. and Chinese foreign policies and of Sino-U.S.
relations, I believe, will be helpful. I shall be very brief, touching on
only the barest essentials.
Though seldom brought out fully, one common feature seems to
grace the diplomatic history of both countries, namely, their respective perception of and approach to power. The language used to couch
their historical postures has only beclouded that commonality. On the
surface, the "isolationist" policy pursued by the United States until
the dawn of the present century had little in common with the
inward-looking mentality of an ancient Chinese empire surrounded
by a web of tributary states. Underneath the surface, however, both
shared a similar nonchalance toward the world outside and the
latter's diplomatic lingua franca, namely, balance of power.
Just like the Chinese empire, which relied on what it conceived
to be self-sufficient power in its own possession, isolationist America
also assumed a self-sufficiency in its own power to protect American
national interests within its own Hemisphere. The disengagement
urged in Washington's Farewell Address and the abstentionism
contained in the Monroe Doctrine were both predicated upon a
conviction that balance of power as a statecraft should be kept on the
European continent and not extended to the Americas. Within the
Hemispheric confines, peace and stability were viewed as dependent
on the preponderance of power anchored in the United States. 1
Likewise, the inward-looking Chinese empire also assumed that,
instead of balance, the preponderance of power located in China held
the key to tranquillity throughout East Asia. Both China and the
United States, therefore, are latecomers in the game of balance of
power. Hans Morgenthau has argued that twentieth-century American crusading globalism, at least until the Vietnam fiasco, was like a
kind of isolationism turned inside out, just as isolationism had been

1. Hans J. Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York:
Praeger, 1969), esp. pp. 15-17; 158-159.
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an inverted globalism before, because both policies were conceptually
predicated upon the same self-sufficiency assumption regarding
American power. 2 One may go on to ask whether the same historical
roots could e.aticipate a future Chinese version of global involvement
on the bternational horizon.
American policy toward China over time has gone through
significant changes and reversals, in response both to shifts in this
country's larger concerns and to changing reality in the Asian-Pacific
area. The first American departure from the isolationist policy was
probably its involvement in the Powers' nineteenth-century competitive meddling in China. A junior partner to this venture then, the
United States had to resort to a balance of power of sorts. The "Open
Door" policy urged upon the Powers by Secretary of State John Hay,
at the turn of the century, was designed to encourage them to accept
limits to their "spheres of influence" and to play a "non-zero-sum
game" in China. It was a plea to keep the door open, as it were, for
the late-comer United States, which no longer enjoyed preponderance
of power once outside of its own geographical preserve.
China remained an "object" (as opposed to "participant") in
international politics and in U.S. foreign policy until World War II.
Determined to forestall a resurgent Japan, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt was prepared to shore up wartime ally China (then under
the Kuomintang government) and to make it a postwar stabilizer in
Asia. At FDR's insistence, the Republic of China (ROC) was made one
of the Big Five in the United Nations. The FDR postwar scenario,
which called for clipping Japan of its wings- detaching Korea and
Taiwan from its control - anticipated a postwar order that would
rest on a regional balance to be presided over by the United States, in
which China would play a special role by dint of its strategic
importance and, equally, because it was expected to remain a U.S.
ally.
The Communist takeover in mainland China upset the original
U.S. designs, with far-reaching consequences. China in Communist
hands ruined American expectations of a staunch ally that would
work in concert with Washington to help curb Soviet expansionism in
the Far East and watch over defeated Japan. Peking's militancy,
displayed during and beyond the Korean War, compelled a reversal of
U.S. policy toward East Asia as a whole. In the new scenario,
especially under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, stability
would depend on relentless direct U.S. involvement, with the support
2. Ibid., p. 16.
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of a revived Japan and a fortified Taiwan <under the Koumintangl
kept in the "free world" camp. This coincided with the "turning inside
out" from isolationism to globalism to which Morgenthau was
referring.
The integration of Taiwan into America's interlocking webs of
mutual security pacts, built in the mid-1950s, was premised upon the
continuing hostility between Washington and a Soviet-backed Peking
regime, which Washington refused to recognize. Containing the
People's Republic of China (PRC) was, therefore, part of the American
efforts toward containing the Soviet empire.
At least three ironies marked the twists and turns of postwar
history. The first is that former enemy Japan, contrary to FDR's
blueprint, had to be helped out of defeat to become a U.S. bulwark in
East Asia. The second is the unexpectedly short-lived duration of the
Peking-Moscow axis, the collapse of which called into question the
very rationale of the U.S. containment policy toward China. The last
irony is that when U.S. policy toward China had to be reversed again
in the 1970s, Taiwan, the ally of nearly three decades, if one starts
counting from the ROC's loss of the China mainland in 1949, became
a stumbling block for a speedy "normalization" of relations with
Peking. Anxiousness to overcome the stumbling block eventually led
President Carter to "abandon" or derecognize Taiwan, as from
January 1, 1979, when diplomatic relations had to be established
with Peking. Yet the same "stumbling block" syndrome has generated much cynicism, among advocates of speedy normalization with
Peking, toward Taiwan; this cynicism remains totally incompatible
with the island's cordial relations with the United States.
Below, I shall attempt to ascertain the rationale of Washington's
new China policy, associated with the "normalization" process and
beyond, and to evaluate its conceptual bases.

The Turnaround in U.S. China Policy
Let me first enumerate some of the most commonly cited reasons
for the turnaround in U.S. attitudes toward Peking, beginning in the
late 1960s. In addition to the Sino-Soviet split mentioned above, the
Vietnam fiasco compelled a reversal in U.S. policy toward the
Asia-Pacific area, which called for the disengagement of U.S. ground
troops from the Asian continent, as under Nixon's Guam Doctrine of
1969. The political vacuum left by the United States, however, had to
be filled, especially in view of Soviet interests in the area. China, now
a potential nuclear power hostile to Moscow, could not be ignored as a
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possible counterweight to a Soviet-backed Hanoi, or a regional
stabilizer, if she could be induced to cooperate with the United States
and Japan. The idea of a regional stabilizer, in part at least, probably
harked back to FDR's original design, although the assumed common
target had shifted from Japan to the Soviet Union.
The new expectations of what China could do in an induced
collaboration with the United States were shared by the principal
architects of U.S. foreign policy under Presidents Nixon and Carter. If
the idea of a "China card" was seminal and latent in Kissinger, it
became more explicit in Brzezinski, the head of the current National
Security Council (NSCl. I would add, however, that the course of
normalizing relations with the PRC had its logic in the world's
transition from the previous era of dyadic nuclear deterrence to a new
era of multiple deterrence. Certain "rules of the game" were
drastically transformed as a result of China's entry into the Nuclear
Club. Although not yet a full-fledged nuclear competitor, China
entered the game as a "spoiler," posing a number of grave questions
for strategic thinking. First, with three in the game it was no longer
possible to identify, with the same certitude as before, the origin of a
nuclear first-strike. A corollary to this "nuclear anonymity" problem
was the danger of a catalytic war, which could be triggered by an
initial attack launched by a third power but simulated as coming
from another source. Even when both these problems were resolved,
given sufficient time and the aid of satellite surveillance, another.
problem, which can be called the "victor's inheritance,'' was insurmountable. That is to say, even if in a bilateral nuclear exchange one
of the countries emerged as the victor, it would still have lost vis-a-vis
the third party, whose nuclear arsenal remained intact. 3
This no-win situation greatly impaired the value of the prevailing concept of massive "punishment" (or MAD, mutual assured
destruction), which had been the central pillar of the <dyadic)
deterrence doctrine. It compelled recognition of an equally important
alter:native approach premised on the concept of "reward." The age of
detente, beginning with Kissinger, would depend on a structure of
peace in which all the nuclear adversaries would be "rewarded" for
mutual good behavior (i.e., not rocking the nuclear boatJ.
A few prerequisites, it should be noted, must be present for the
reward structure to work. (a) In the first place, decision-makers must
take a holistic view of foreign policy, so that losses in one area can be
3. Richard Rosecrance, The Future of the International Strategic System !San
Francisco: Chandler, 1972), pp. 135-140.

THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS

5

made up by gains elsewhere. Trade-offs are extremely important if
the reward structure is to work, and they are possible only if the
principal national actors are playing a non-zero-sum game. (bJ The
sources of capability of the principal actors must be differentiated
from each other so that each will have something to offer in the
rewarding exchange. (c) All principal actors must be involved in an
ever-expanding web of interdependence, so that any attempt by one to
hurt another will, by the workings of interdependence, boomerang. (d)
There should be no ganging-up by any two against a third nuclear
power, lest the reward chain be broken.<
Although there are other "rules," these are the most essential
ones. The reward structure would not work unless all the principals
are willing to accept one another as co-equals. Hence, the new "rules
of the game" contained a logic compelling the U.S. to abandon its
previous non-recognition policy and to accept the PRC officially as a
principal actor.
Before we go on, let us pause here to note that the entire
Kissingerian detente scenario required (a) a sufficient degree of
interdependence, in order for the concept of mutual reward to work,
and (b) a compatible willingness on the part of all the principals to
accept the same premises. Here lies the flimsy foundation on which
the entire detente policy was built. While containment as a policy was
abolished, the structure of peace Kissinger sought remained to be
built. 5 The degree of interdependence required for the concept of
mutual reward to work effectively, as a self-enlightened guarantee of
peace, would still take years to materialize. The defect in the
Kissingerian blueprint of peace in this respect is that it fell into a
tautology. It set out to build, bit by bit, an increasingly mutually
dependent relationship between the two superpowers (and with
China), so that ultimately they would be so bound to each other that
neither would seek to hurt the other if it would mean self-hurting as
well. (An everyday analogy would be a husband-wife joint checking
account: the wife who attempts to hurt the husband by squandering
away his money will find that she is squandering away her own
money, too.) But, then, it plunged into treating U.S.-Soviet relations
as though the marriage was already in existence. 6
4. Ibid., pp. 151-159.
5. This point was made by Stanley Hoffman in a stimulating critique of the
Kissingerian legacy, Op-Ed, New York Times, January 16, 1977, p. 19.
6. For a more detailed discussion, see my "U.S. Relations with China in the
Post-Kissingerian Era: A Sensible Policy for the 1980's," Asian Survey, XVII, 8 (August
1977), 691-710.
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The snowballing effect of detente did not occur as its architect
had expected. Neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union,
stopped seeking unilateral advantages by exploiting the other's
political weaknesses as they emerged. Kissingerian detente did not
change, nor could it have changed, Soviet overall strategy. Detente
would work only if and when the structure of interdependence had
already come into existence, or at least when the principals shared,
with a comparable degree of conviction, a perceived common destiny,
but not before. 7

The Kissingerian Premises and the Opening to China
The opening to China and the modality set for it in the Shanghai
communique signed by President Nixon in February, 1972, followed
certain premises which were related to but not necessarily compatible
with the overall Kissingerian design for detente.
(1) The first premise was that the Sino-Soviet split was
irreversible and the United States could take advantage of it by
alternately "tilting" to one and then the other of the two Communist
giants. It appears to me that the Kissingerian "tilting" strategy ran
afoul of one of the crucial maxims (or "rules of the game") of detente,
viz., that there be no ganging-up. Furthermore, the intent to
manipulate one Communist power against the other undercut the
very conceptual foundation of detente that required mutual reward
for good behavior (not rocking the boat).
The opening to Chin~--in 1972 was a Kissingerian tactic to coerce
the Soviets into detente with the U.S., taking advantage of the
competitive nature of Sino-Soviet relations. Then in 1974, the United
States turned around and tilted toward the Soviet Union, as though
to placate the Soviets at the expense of the Chinese (e.g., the choice of
the site for the Vladivostock conference). In the end, tilting succeeded
in alternately alienating the Soviets (hence, the SALT II impasse)
and then the Chinese, who reduced their trade with the United States
in 1975-1976 and returned to militant rhetoric in early 1976.
(2) The second Kissingerian premise had to do with his balance
of power preoccupation and with China's position in the larger
U.S.-Soviet relationship. Kissinger's blueprint was taken from the
19th-century European diplomatic experience, more especially from
the Bismarckian "supergame" design aimed at building a web of
7. Ibid. Also, George Liska, Beyond Kissinger: Ways of Conservative Statecraft
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
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balancing bilaterial relationships of the major powers, to the
exclusion of the lesser actors. Furthermore, there was also an
assumption about China's relative strength. To Kissinger, China was
then strong enough to be a counterweight to the Soviets, but not
strong enough to threaten the United States.
The same disregard for changing times which had underscored
Kissinger's penchant for replaying the 19th-century balancing game
was responsible for his insensitivity toward the temporal limitations
in his calculations about the value of China's relative power. What if
at time-n China's power should become a threat equally to the Soviet
Union and the United States? Would there be any back-up support
the United States could draw on, in a new round of realignments'!
That eventuaHty didn't seem to have entered into Kissinger's
calculations, in his design for a balanced structure of peace.
Since Kissinger had no anticipation for a possible U.S. need for
back-up support in coping with China at time-n, Taiwan held out no
strategic significance for Kissinger either now or in the future. And,
precisely because he was preoccupied with supergame politics,
Kissinger was anxious to dispose of Taiwan as a stumbling block in
U.S.-PRC relations. He was known to be willing to accept the original
Chinese wording for the Shanghai communique in 1972, which would
have explicitly and irretrievably committed the United States to
abandoning the island without any recourse or compensating concessions in return. Only Nixon's masterful inte:rjection of fuzziness
restored flexibility to the United States, changing the wording to
read:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side
of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that
Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. 8
(3) The third Kissingerian premise was that if China was to be
encouraged to direct its undivided attention northward, to deal with
the Soviets, all her "southern" problems (i.e., the Vietnam conflict
and the Taiwan question) must be resolved for her once and for all.
Only then, so the thinking went, would Peking's leaders be relieved of

8. See the "Shanghai Communique" of February 27, 1972, text reproduced in U.S.
Department of State, Selected Documents No. 9: U.S. Policy Toward China. July 15,
1971-January 15, 1979 (January 1979), p. 6.
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all their woes and worries along their southern borders and train
their sights wholeheartedly on Moscow. The assumption here that
decision-makers could deal with only one issue at· a time - that
China could not simultaneously deal with her Colossal North and her
"southern" problems- is highly questionable and even alarming.
Perhaps Kissinger was projecting his personal experience to the
case, thinking that in Peking, too, there was his Chinese counterpart
very much made in his own image, concentrating in his hands all
major foreign policy matters. Years later, we were to learn by
Kissinger's own admission that his preoccupation with the Middle
East at one point had left this country without an African policy, thus
giving the Soviets a free hand in Angola. 9

The Brzezinski Premises and Normalization
Although there is no one central place to look for an authoritative and unequivocal statement of Washington's foreign policy today,
there does seem to be an awareness among President Carter's inner
circles of some of the deficiencies in the Kissingerian legacy. Perhaps
nowhere is this borne out more substantively than in the rationale or
philosophy behind the series of orchestrated foreign visits by
high-level officials, starting with President Carter's two extended
trips abroad in late 1977 and early 1978. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the
President's national security adviser, spelled out that philosophy
most cogently in his briefing with reporters on December 20, 1977. He
began with a diagnosis of the far-reaching changes since World War
II, marked by a steady decline in the West's power, starting with
decolonialization and culminating in the West's growing dependence
on vital resources from the less-developed countries (LDC's).
On the eve of World War II, Brzezinski noted, the West controlled
80% of the world's land mass and 75% of the world's population. By
the end of the century, 80% of the global population will live in what
he called the "southern arc," extending from Latin America and
Africa, to Asia. This drastic demographic shift, along with other
changes, he pointed out, had ominous implications for the West and
required an immediate remedial policy.
The reality of the world today, Brzezinski continued, is one in
which power is diffused among four basic groups: (a) the advanced
world, including the industrial West and Japan; (b) the Communist
world; (c) the world of the relatively rich but still developing
9. Carl T. Rowan, "The Wise Dr. Kissinger," Washington Star, October 12, 1979.
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countries (particularly the OPEC nations and a few of the more
successful developing countries, Taiwan, South Korea, etc.); and (d)
the fourth world of the "global poor." With this diffusion of power, the
United States can no longer dictate to the world, nor can it narrow
itself to playing merely a supergame, ignoring the intermediate
powers.
The instinct of survival, therefore, dictates that the United States
not allow itself to get into a crossfire of both East-West conflicts (i.e.,
supergame conflicts involving our national security) and North-South
conflicts (i.e., subgame conflicts involving the industrial nations'
access to resources in the LDC's), all converging to tap the United
State's responsive capacity. The foremost task for U.S. foreign policy,
according to the NSC chairman, is how to rally together the three
non-Communist worlds on the U.S. side, or, in other words, to line up
a West-South alliance. In so doing, however, the United States must
anticipate and accommodate the growing political awareness or, in
Brzezinski's words, "rising crescendo," among countries in the South
Arc, and make the best of the Sino-Soviet division and the general
contradictions within the Communist world.
The most important point, as it appears, is a purported departure
from the Kissingerian supergame scenario. Supergame is not to be
abandoned, but to be played within a larger, truly global, context.
The United States will do its utmost to enlarge the pool of real or
potential back-up allies beyond the immediate Washington-MoscowPeking triangle. Brzezinski was probably voicing the Carter Administration's desires for a new policy orientation when he stated that the
earlier U.S. "Atlanticist Connection" (that is, more or less exclusive
economic and military alignment with Western Europe), a doctrine
directly linked to Kissinger, was no longer adequate. 10
Despite the anti-Kissingerian rhetoric, however, the foreign
policy output during the first two and one-half years of the Carter
Administration does not seem to corroborate the existence of a
coherent foreign policy "architecture," as distinct from playing
"acrobatics," a charge previously leveled at Kissinger by critic
Brzezinski during the Nixon-Ford years. If anything, the purported
architecture merely exists on paper, not in actual policy, far less in
implementation. Despite the lip service to the well-being of the
10. Brzezinski's briefing to reporters, December 20, 1977. See also his speech to
the International Platform Association, August 2. 1979. "American Power and Global
Change," released by the U.S. Department of State, as Current Policy No. 81.
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LDC's, Washington has taken no concrete steps to improve NorthSouth relations, as can be witnessed in the South's recalcitrant
reaction to the Tokyo round of the GATT negotiations and the
agreement initialed by the United States and 19 other industrial
nations in Geneva, in April, 1979. 11
Despite the verbal acknowledgement of ideological pluralism in
Brzezinski's statement, the current Administration's policy has been
much more moralistically tinged than under four previous Presidents.
Carter's own "human rights" concerns have given a new fillip to
ideological moralism, which was certainly lacking with Kissinger.
Brzezinski's personal hatred for Soviet Communism has only reinforced the ideological bitterness.
Despite the outward importance attached to regional and intermediate powers, as propounded by the national security adviser, the
Carter Administration has committed itself to withdrawing U.S.
troops from South Korea, albeit at a slower pace than originally
scheduled as a result of criticisms; it has not made a habit of
consulting regional leaders in its approach to the Middle East or
Latin America; and it has downgraded its relations with Taiwan
without much regard for the sentiments of the other Asian neighbors
(e.g., Singapore and Japan). None of these omissions or commissions
shows much respect for regional or intermediate powers.
In the normalization of relations with Peking, Washington
manifested certain aspirations or followed certain assumptions which
seemed to rest on quite questionable grounds, to which we shall now
turn.
(1) In the first place, the Brzezinski-Oksenberg team in the
NSC has inherited all the three Kissingerian premises discussed
above, in fact, if not completely in rhetoric. Despite Brzezinski's
verbal criticism of Kissinger's supergame fixation, the current NSC
head does not seem to have outgrown his earlier preoccupation with
triangularity. Writing in 1972 in criticism of Kissinger's balance of
power "delusion," Brzezinski had stressed that, contrary to the
Kissingerian assumptions, China was not a full-fledged partner in the
Washington-Moscow-Peking triangle, and that there were only "2 and
Y2 powers" in the world. Besides, he continued, "what we now have,
and are likely to have for some time, is a combination of a bipolar
11. At the 5th session of UNCTAD, in Manila, May 7-June 3, 1978, the LDC's
charged that the new Geneva agreement initialed by the 20 industrial nations hurts
more than it helps the poor. New York Times, May 7, 1979. See also U.N. Chronicle,
July 1979, p. 44ff.
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power world and a multiple state interplay." The United States
occupied a pivotal role in two overlapping triangles, one competitive,
and the other cooperative: American-China-Russia, and AmericaEurope-Japan. The author proclaimed then that our cooperative
relationship with Europe and Japan needed to be made more
cooperative for the sake of human progress; and the competitive one
with Russia and China needed to be made less competitive for the
sake of peace. ~ Now as Carter's principal security adviser, Brzezinski,
however, has reversed himself, except in his habit of thinking of
foreign policy in terms of triangularities. He has not only become
more and more like Kissinger but in some aspects has gone even
much further.
The return to triangularity, first of all, is an abandonment of the
brief skirting with a global architecture, which Brzezinski so
eloquently glorified during the beginning months of the Carter
Administration. His personal fixation with the America-Russia-China
triangle has turned out to be a repetition of Kissinger's supergame
sylldrome in everything but the name. Instead of his own 1972 call for
making that triangular relationship less competitive, Brzezinski, in
actively playing the "China card," has pushed U.S.-Soviet competition
into a new high. The episode of Soviet troops in Cuba in the Fall of
1979 was a first public reminder of the quiet intensifications of
bisuperpower competition.
The present NSC chief has not only accepted Kissinger's
assumption reg·arding the permanence of the Sino-Soviet split and his
balance of power "delusion," but has turned the Kissingerian tilting
game into a zealous card game: playing the "China card" against
Moscow. If the tilting had been a temporary tactic, to be played
alternately in favor of China and then the Soviet Union, the card
game now has all the appearance of a permanent fixture in
Washington's current foreign policy. According to a testimony before
Congress on October 16, 1979, by Dr. Marshall D. Shulman, the State
Department's ranking Soviet adviser, U.S.-Soviet relations "are
unlikely to be reconciled in the near future" as long as U.S.
favoritism toward Peking continues. 13 Kissinger's tilting was still in
the tradition of balance of power and still preserved a semblance of
evenhandedness, although in a zigzagged way, toward both the
1

12. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Balance of Power Delusion," Foreign Policy, No. 7
!Summer 1972), esp. pp. 57-58.
13. See Bernard Gwertzman, "Evenhanded Treatment of Moscow and Peking
Faces Test," New York Times, October 16, 1979.
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Chinese and the Soviets. The current "out to get the Russians"
posture, doggedly seeking to cultivate a loose alliance with the
enemy's enemy to make a score, seems to have thrown all scruples
about evenhandedness to the winds. 14
The loss of evenhandedness, which preceded the Soviet "invasion"
of Afghanistan, has resulted from the collapse of a global-balance
paradigm postulating the interaction and mutually restraining roles
by a multiple set of actors playing a non-zero-sum game. In its place
has arisen an orientation thrown off balance by a singular anti-Soviet
preoccupation. Conceptually, the collapse incurs the perils of returning to a cold-war bipolar mentality, in that all other nations become
pawns in the American contention with the Soviet Union. The
overriding desires to take on the Soviets, quite naturally, led to the
"discovery" of China as a potential ally (qua pawn), whose newly
found strategic importance not only justified advancing the normalization timetable and upgrading U.S. relations with Peking, but
shunted off considerations for possible advantages of simultaneous
normalization, or maintaining evenhandedness, with Vietnam. Just
as the tilt toward China away from the Soviet Union has set in
motion a chain of reactions threatening the continuance of detente in
·early 1980, the loss of evenhandedness in Washington's posture
toward China and Vietnam has encouraged Hanoi to seek closer ties
with Moscow and step up its adventures in Kampuchea with a
vengeance. 15 There is a self-fulfilling prophecy in both cases.
In playing the China card, Brzezinski has embraced the premise
of the irreversibility of the Sino-Soviet split with greater piety than
Kissinger ever did. Ironically, he may even point to events in early
1980 as proof of the inevitability of further intensification of the
Sino-Soviet competition, among other places, in Southwest Asia. The
irreversibility assumption ignores both the lessons of history and the
place of Realpolitik (i.e., national interest). The making and breaking
of the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s was guided primarily by
considerations of convergent national interests. A historical antecedent was the secret alliance of 1896 concluded by Prime Minister Li
Hung-chang with his Tsarist Russian counterpart, Count Wittie,
which was likewise dictated by a common interest (in this case,
against a common enemy, Japan). The likelihood of a Sino-Soviet

14. Ibid.
15. Gareth Porter, "U.S. and Vietnam October 20, 1979, pp. 366-369.

The Missed Chance," The Nation,
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rapprochement, therefore, depends on the test of convergent interests
in the future, not on our wishful thinking or card-playing.
China is not a "card" any more than the United States is a
"card." The very image of a "card" is that it is without volition and
independent judgment. China, on the contrary, is fully aware of the
danger of being drawn too closely into the American technological
orbit, which would cause her to lose her independence. It was over the
defense of her national independence that Chi:r:ta clashed with her
Soviet ally earlier. As I learned during my visit in China, in
August-September 1979, Peking's leaders are consciously resisting
Washington's card-playing by embarking upon a multi-channeled
diplomacy, keeping all doors open, including the door on the north,
and spreading her eggs in different baskets. Despite the distractions
of Peking's anti-Soviet rhetoric, the Chinese did try to give new
impetus to the Sino-Soviet talks, which were first resumed in Moscow
in September, 1979, and later shifted back to Peking, the habitual
site, until halted in January, 1980, because of the Afghanistan crisis.
Washington's card playing not only violates the evenhanded
principle vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It, too, violates the "no ganging
up" maxim noted before, to an extent that has surpassed Kissinger's
tilting game. Washington's acceptance, at Chinese insistence, of the
anti-hegemony clause in the final communique signed by President
Carter and visiting Deputy Premier Deng, on February 1, 1979,
constituted a clear case that the "no ganging up" maxim was ignored.
The clause containing the Chinese code-word for anti-Sovietism upset
the President's earlier assurance that U.S. normalization of relations
with the PRC was not at the expense of any other country but purely
in the interest of peace. ' 6
(2) The most important Brzezinski-Oksenberg addendum to the
Kissingerian legacy is the premise that it is in the American interest
to make China a responsible actor.' 7 The greatly elevated role
imputed to China, it should be noted, is a reversal of Brzezinski's own
claim in 1972, while criticizing Kissinger, that China was not in the
superpower company and should not play such a role.
There is a twisted logic in the new reasoning, which runs like
this: (a) If there is instability in the international environment, it is
16. See President Carter's remarks to reporters on December 15, 1978, announcing
the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Text in
Selected Documents No.9, op. cit., n.B above, p. 47.
17. See Brzezinski's remarks at a Department of State briefing on China, January
15, 1979, in ibid., p. 61-64.

14

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIERS SERIES

because China has not been brought into the supergame and has not
been acting responsibly; (b) if China has not acted responsibly it is
because she is not strong enough; so let us make her stronger; and (c)
if there is still no stability, then it is because we have not made China
strong enough to act responsibly; so let us do more to make her even
stronger. The implicit assumption here is that once made sufficiently
strong, reaching a parity with Moscow, China will be a responsible
counterweight shielding the United States from the brunt of the
Soviet threat.
To the layman, the expectation seems to have been substantiated
in the midst of the Afghan crisis, when the United States actually
looked to China for cooperation in countering the Soviet advance. The
reasoning has questionable long-range application, however, since it
is based on one's faith- as opposed to reality- that China, when
made sufficiently powerful, will remain an unswerving U.S. ally and
continue to be indiscriminately anti-Soviet. All this would be possible
only if we had a reasonable assurance that China could be made to
play into our hands and do our bidding in our conflicts with Moscow.
Furthermore, one should not lose sight of an analogy in the history of
U.S.-Soviet relations: The detente between the two superpowers
became possible only after, not before, the Soviets had reached a
position of nuclear parity with the United States. What is there to
assure us that the Chinese will spurn similar detente efforts once
they have reached a parity with Moscow?
Moreover, our definition of a responsible actor may or may not
coincide with Peking's expectations. A military invasion of Taiwan,
for example, would not be an irresponsible act in Peking's eyes and
would be merely an "internal affair" involving a Chinese province. To
Brzezinski, a responsible China should act to help this country curb
Soviet expansionism. To be true, a responsible posture from Peking's
, point of view, when she has attained parity, could mean any of the
' following things: (a) a bolder stance against Moscow, (b) a possible
Sino-Soviet rapprochement, especially if China's relations with
Washington should go sour, or (c) a more independent foreign policy,
aloof from both Washington and Moscow. There is no reason to
anticipate any one singular outcome, or to expect Peking to dance to
Washington's (or Brzezinski's) tunes.
For similar reasons, one should be cautious about the prospect of
China cooperating with Washington, in the foreseeable future, in the ·
latter's attempt to build a West-South alliance, encompassing the
industrially advanced nations and the LDC's, directed against
Moscow. For Peking to cooperate momentarily with Washington in
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responding to a given common threat such as over Afghanistan' 8 is
one thing. But to commit itself to a perpetual supporting role in a
major area of the U.S.'s global concerns is quite another. As an
independent nation, China should be expected to maintain her own
flexibility and discretion in regard to both the Soviet Union and the
Third World countries.
(3) Another Brzezinski-Oksenberg premise underlining our current China policy is the assumption that China's preoccupation with
its internal "four modernizations" at home will make her dependent
upon the U.S.'s and Japan's good will and technological transfers.
This dependency, so the argument goes, will help constrain Peking
and keep it a responsible actor. 19 The problem with the dependency
thesis is three-fold: (a) No country's foreign policy today, especially in
China's case, can be made intractably dependent on any other country
either for good will or vital imports. What China does not get from
the United States, she can get from West Germany, Japan, France,
England, Italy, or another source. (During my visit in Moscow, in
January 1980, I was struck by reciprocal Soviet desires to improve
relations with China, and Soviet interest in greater Soviet-Chinese
trade.) As noted before, the Chinese are consciously reacting to
Washington's orbit-building efforts and are committed to a policy of
spreading out their risks. This may explain why Chairman Hua
Guofeng chose to visit France, West Germany, England, and Italy, in
October 1979, prior to his scheduled trip to the United States in 1980.
(b) The second problem with the dependency premise is its
neglect of the possibility that as China becomes stronger, albeit in
part owing to U.S. help and encouragement, the kind of restraints
that Washington may be able to place upon it now will almost

18. Even over Mghanistan, Peking's "cooperation" was muted, and the Chinese
opposed the proposal of "neutralizing" Afghanistan, which was supported by
Washington.
19. A most typical representation of the argument is the following statement in a
Department of State news release: "China's self·interest lies in constructive relations
with the United States, Japan, and other nations of the world. The PRC has a major
stake in avoiding actions that would put those relationships at grave risk, particularly
as it devotes its primary attention to modernization." Text reproduced in Normalization
of U.S.-China Relations: A Collection of Documents and Press Coverage !China Council,
Asia Society, New York: January, 1979l, p. 30. Similar views were expressed by
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 5, 1979, in
Taiwan: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate, 96th
Congress, 1st Sess. fU.S. Government Printing Office, 1979!, pp. 16, 30.
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certainly diminish in proportion to the increase in China's power.
Yet, it is precisely the perpetuation of those restraints that our
present China policy is pursuing and by which it is justified to the
American public.
(c) The third problem is less tangible, but no less significant. In
an increasingly interdependent world, no dependency relationship is
without mutual liabilities between giver and receiver. Even assuming
that China, by a stroke of luck, was cajoled, encouraged, induced, and
hoodwinked into becoming a technological satellite of the United
States, that dependency would have created a "coercive deficiency" for
Peking, which the Chinese can easily manipulate to their advantage
against us. Let me explain.
"Coercive deficiency" here refers to a paradoxical relationship in
which a seemingly power-deficient debtor may sometimes have
enough leverage to coerce the creditor into lending him more money
or into rescheduling the loan simply because the two are bound in
such a mutual dependency that the creditor just cannot afford to see
the debtor go bankrupt. 20 Similarly, efforts at creating a Chinese
dependency through the granting of indebtedness and making
China's technology dependent on continuing supplies of U.S. parts
and technical data may in turn create an unexpected leverage in
Peking's hands typical of the "coercive deficiency" phenomenon.
Chinese leverage, conceivably, would be further enhanced under any
of the following conditions: (i) when the U.S. economy is soft and
cannot afford Chinese withdrawals from the U.S. market, (ii) when
the Soviet Union, or another rival of the United States, is willing to
offer better terms to hurt the United States by encouraging Chinese
withdrawals, and (iii) when Chinese withdrawals would bring
enormous benefits to a rival of the United States or herald similar
withdrawals by China's supporters.

20. For a fuller development of the point, see Susan Strange, "The Meaning of
Multilateral Surveillance," in Robert W. Cox, ed., International Organization: World
Politics (London: Macmillan, 1969).
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Conclusion
Our foreign policy is as adequate as the conceptual foundation on
which it is built. Likewise, the adequacy of our China policy depends
on the soundness of its conceptual bases. The morals from the
foregoing discussion are simple and evident. Our China connection, or
playing the "China card," is no sounder than the premises on which it
is grounded, and most of these premises, as we have attempted to
show, are either highly questionable, incoherent among themselves or
faultily conceived. This is not an indictment against any individual,
but an exercise in analytical thinking about our foreign policy and, in
particular, our China policy, arising out of a citizen's concerns about
our national interest.
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